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ABSTRACT
War crimes prosecution has been the dominant tool of addressing war crimes
committed during the four-year-long conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (19921995). The prosecution has been conducted at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia and in the local courts.
The paper will address the effectiveness of war crimes prosecution as a tool for
combating future crimes, taking into account the accomplishments and shortcomings
at all levels – international, national and local. The paper will also address other
complementary mechanisms aiming at minimizing the potential for future conflicts.
The ICTY and the courts in BiH have conducted numerous trials in the past fifteen
years; hundreds have been investigated and prosecuted but the question remains, can
war crimes prosecutions, when conducted fairly and timely be an investment into the
country’s future? And if so what can we learn from the BiH experience to secure
proper prosecution in similar situations.
Iva Vukusic works at Sense News Agency in The Hague where she manages the
archive of war crimes trials held at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. Iva also worked as an analyst at the Special War Crimes Department of
the State Prosecutor’s office in Sarajevo.
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Introduction
Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter BiH) is a country where horrendous crimes were
committed during the 1992-1995 war. This article will discuss the war crimes
prosecution that followed the war and will touch upon how prosecution can
potentially be used as a tool against future crimes1, especially genocide2. Successes
and shortcomings of the prosecution effort will be explored along with the question of
what lessons can be learned from the prosecutions that followed the war in Bosnia.
The observations presented are based on several years of working in the war crimes
prosecution in Sarajevo, but also regularly following the trials at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The observations
made are the ones of a practitioner; after interviews and conversations I have had with
prosecutors and judges, journalists, human rights activists, academics and others
heavily involved in the war crimes prosecution system. Academic work informed this
article but the conclusions are based on practical experience.
For the past 17 years, after the Dayton Accords3 ended the war, the country has been
divided, its administrative structure highly complex4. BiH has fourteen governments
(incapacity by local authorities to form governments post-election makes this number
currently lower). The country is divided into two entities and one autonomous district.
There is one government for the country as a whole, one for each entity: the
Federation with a majority of Bosniaks and Croats (Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, FBiH); Republika Srpska (RS) with a predominantly Serb population
and Brcko District that does not have such a clear majority. The FBiH is further
territorially divided into ten cantons, each of them with one government. This results
in institutional fragmentation with a significant impact on the war crimes prosecution
effort within the country.
It is estimated that the country has just over 4.5 million inhabitants but conclusive
data is unavailable as the last census was conducted on the eve of war in 19915. The
population is ethnically diverse with the majority, just above 45 percent Bosniak
(Muslim), around 35 percent Serb (Orthodox) and around 15 percent Croat
(Catholic)6. The rest are small minority groups.
The constitutional framework is complicated and makes the decision-making process
difficult, prone to being stalled7. Nationalist parties still have a hold in power in many
communities; unemployment is around 40%8, economic growth is slow and poverty is
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prevalent, especially in the rural areas hard hit by the violence 20 years ago. The
wartime demographic changes affected the entire country and many small
communities are gone. Refugee return is incomplete and dozens of refugee camps still
exist.
The presence of the international community is still strong albeit, clearly, much less
visible on the ground than immediately after the war. This somewhat vague term
‘international community’ includes the Office of the High Representative (OHR)9 and
foreign governments and organizations as well as donors that contributed heavily to
post-war reconstruction. These actors, mainly foreign governments through their
embassies, EU offices, different international organizations such as the UNDP and the
OSCE – all are relevant to the war crimes prosecution effort as they interact with the
authorities within BiH, influencing the situation on the ground. Many also assisted in
funding various transitional justice projects or contributed to the funds needed for
setting up local trials.
The political situation in the country is often tense, rarely without references that
somehow evoke the recent bloodshed. Ethnic divisions exist, although they are much
more visible in smaller communities hard hit by the bloodshed.
Hopes of membership in the European Union and benefits of some security and
prosperity it seems to provide (at least in comparison to the conditions in BiH) are
hindered by the slowness of any progress. BiH seems to have somewhat ‘fallen off’
the priority list. It has been, after all, seventeen years since the peace agreement was
signed. As a result, all the hopes for a faster approach to the free movement of people,
goods and services and a higher respect for human rights are quietly being let down.
As years go by and other conflicts take center stage, it is difficult for BiH to remain a
priority. Today there is a concern over the winding down of donor activities in the
region and that could potentially harm the prosecution effort in the future10.
War crimes prosecution is always a challenging task, no matter the context (and, of
course, each context is different). When the number of suspects is significant, even
overwhelming (believed to be around 10 000 only in BiH)11; where there is still ethnic
tension and political pressure against prosecutions; where the crimes are so numerous
and the funding so scarce; where political manipulation and denial is prevalent, any
such endeavor would be difficult. However, there are lessons to be learned from the
experiences we did have in BiH, where the prosecution has been conducted at both
the international and the national level.
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A controversial issue has also been the quantification of victims of the conflict12.
There are two main sources, internationally recognized as most credible, that have
attempted to identify the number of victims of the war in BiH. However, after
conflicts as long lasting and brutal and spread-out geographically it is impossible to
have completely accurate data. We strive to have estimates, good estimates, based on
reliable sources and accurate methodology. This data includes the dead and missing
‘on all sides’ i.e. the Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and others that perished.
The Research and Documentation Center (RDC)13 in Sarajevo, an heir of the Bosnian
government’s Center for Researching War Crimes that was formed during the war is
one of them. The other source is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia14 i.e. the reports that form part of the evidence presented to its judges;
expert reports made by certified, professional statisticians and demographers. Both
sources put the number of deaths and disappearances around one hundred thousand.
Most of the victims were Bosniak Muslims. Civilians form large part of those that
were murdered or that disappeared.
It is important to note that the methodology of data collection for missing persons and
interpretation of this data has been a source of much contention at the ICTY where
numerous experts argued about numbers and circumstances of death and burial of
thousands of victims. The Srebrenica trials are a good example because in all trials
relating to the mass executions after the fall of the enclave, there were numerous
testimonies about who the dead men were; how they died and how many were found
and identified15.
The role of war crimes prosecution
Since the war ended in 1995, war crimes prosecution has been the dominant tool of
addressing war crimes committed during the four-year-long conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The prosecution has been conducted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, the national institutions (Court of BiH, Sarajevo i.e. the War
Crimes Chamber) and the local courts (cantonal and district courts in Republika
Srpska, the Federation of BiH and the Brcko District). There were also trials in
several other countries such as Germany and Norway but they will remain outside the
scope of this article.
Fair and impartial war crimes trials - the effective, consistent and transparent delivery
of justice - can contribute to stabilizing a post-conflict society and preventing future
crimes. This can be clearly seen in BiH. Because of the war crimes prosecution
12
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system put in place as well as other measures implemented on the ground, BiH is less
likely to be ravaged by war today.
There are questions over war crimes prosecution always being effective and fair (we
can also question ‘fairness’ and what it means in this context, but that is an entirely
separate topic). There are also several ways to conduct trials, internationally,
nationally or within a hybrid system. There are also questions on whether retribution
through trials is the best approach to dealing with the past. Maybe truth commissions
are sometimes more adequate than court proceedings although recently more and
more potential models of ‘coexistence’ of the two are being conceptualized and
implemented. Nevertheless, in the case of BiH, prosecutions did produce some
positive effects that minimize the potential of future conflict.
What is necessary for the prosecution system to be beneficial for a society is that it
needs to work with other complementary mechanisms such as fact-finding missions,
various reparation models for victims, memorials and acknowledgment of the
suffering (an issue of much contention between different communities in BiH), open
public discussion and fighting denial, property return, finding missing persons and
giving them a proper burial, vetting within institutions, reform of the judiciary etc. All
these measures need to work in concert and that was not the case in BiH. There is no
political agreement on most of the above mentioned issues and therefore, the
grievances of many victims remain unaddressed. The impact of the tribunals’ work,
even when fairly successful, is limited from the perspective of coexistence of different
groups after a conflict. The justice they deliver is not perfect, and the limitations will
be discussed further in this article.
After war crimes have been committed in a conflict, a well-planned assessment of the
situation needs to be conducted and the most appropriate measures to implement in
concert must to be found. War crimes prosecution - conducted fairly and impartially,
respecting established legal norms - should be part of that policy. This also includes
ensuring equality of arms and the right of the accused to a fair trial. Prosecutions must
be completely divorced from political pressure - that is the only way they can
succeed.
What must be stressed is that trials can’t do everything; they can’t fix many of the
problems of a post-war society. By themselves, they can’t bring peace or
reconciliation and expecting them to do so is making sure they fail our expectations.
With the establishment of the ICTY, hopes of many were running high, too high
probably. Today, almost 20 years after the historical establishment of the Tribunal,
the first institution of its kind, many are disappointed even though it had significant
successes. Are they disappointed because they expected too much?16
War Crimes Trials
16
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The prosecution system for crimes committed in BiH between 1992 and 1995 can be,
in order to somewhat simplify matters, divided into three ‘layers’: the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, the State Court in
Sarajevo and the local courts in BiH (ten cantonal courts in FBiH, five district courts
in the RS and one court in Brcko). In total, not more than 300 people have been
prosecuted for crimes during the war in Bosnia, on all levels. This is however an
estimate because no official, centralized data-collection exists.
The concept that has been applied at the ICTY in relation to domestic systems in the
former Yugoslavia is one of primacy (i.e. the ICTY having the ‘first choice’ of whom
to prosecute and it ‘handing down’ cases to local courts). The local governments have
a legal obligation to cooperate and this cooperation has been difficult throughout the
years, causing much political strife in the former Yugoslavia. The national institutions
in the region, in Serbia, in Croatia and BiH should also cooperate in the interest of
conducting investigations and bringing suspects to trial but they often fail to do so
successfully17.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The ICTY is the first post-Second World War international tribunal, an ad hoc
institution established by the Security Council of the United Nations in May 1993 by
Resolution 82718. Since then, numerous practitioners, academics from various
disciplines as well as activists discussed the Tribunal with varying levels of critique or
enthusiasm, but its jurisprudence and impact have been widely studied and its
relevance cannot be disputed.
Article 1 of the Tribunal’s Statute states its competence:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present
Statute19.
Some efforts were made during the war to prosecute war crimes: criminal and
investigative reports written and indictments issued against members of enemy forces
or their political leaders. This was done ‘on all sides’, within both military and
civilian prosecutorial structures. Nevertheless, it was within a highly politicized
context, during a war, where political goals governed much of the behavior of
prosecutors and judges. The ICTY did ‘pick up’ some of the cases when it ‘scanned’
existing war crimes files in the prosecutors’ offices around the country. However,
when war crimes prosecution is discussed today - a system based on the rule of law –
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it is about efforts that followed the establishment of the ICTY, which was indeed a
groundbreaking event in international law.
From its humble beginnings the ICTY has grown into an important institution. The
chief prosecutor and president of the Tribunal give regular reports to the Security
Council and the European Union. Accession of the former Yugoslav states to the
European block is tied with cooperation with the Tribunal and form part of the socalled ‘EU conditionality’ concept. This has proven to be quite a success in the former
Yugoslavia as government cooperation (such as making arrests or surrendering
documents) was insured through methods of rewards and pressure from Brussels.
Administering justice in The Hague is costly - the budget for 2011 is approximately
150 million US dollars20. The Tribunal has now seven trials ongoing and six more on
appeal21. Two trials are yet to begin. Since it was established, 161 individuals have
been indicted, 160 men and one woman22. Earlier this year the arrests of the last two
fugitives, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, took place. That is an outstanding success,
one that was ensured after many years of waiting.
If we discuss cost, we need to also address the complexity of these cases. Even the
least complicated trials have lasted for months and they are a result of years of
investigation: interviewing witnesses across the globe, forensic examinations of mass
graves, sweeping archives around the region, having experts prepare reports, doctors
and psychiatrists asses the physical and psychological condition of the accused… The
standard of proof is high, the procedure complex. The trials include hundreds of
witnesses, thousands of documents, months in the courtroom. The accused are often
charged with multiple crimes in a large area over a long period of time. Proving guilty
or establishing innocence takes time and effort and many criticize the trials especially
due to their length.
Initially, the ICTY was supposed to prosecute those most responsible for war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide committed in a conflict that lasted for almost a
decade. The resources were limited, the idea yet untested. Limits needed to be set on
the list of potential suspects. Yet the ICTY had no police force of its own and the first
arrests were difficult. The arrests remained a challenge all the way to the end, to the
arrest of the last fugitive. As this institution was the first of its kind, it devised policies
and approaches as it went along.
The prosecutorial strategy (i.e. case selection), outreach and other important segments
of the Court’s work were properly planned several years into the work of the
institution. There were also difficult tasks placed in front of the Tribunal - achieving
peace and security, as stated in the Statute from May 1993:
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‘… the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law…would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.’23
The expectations were high as the ICTY was essentially the only place where the
grievances of thousands of victims could be addressed at the time. There was an
expectation too that the Tribunal would bring reconciliation. ‘Reconciliation’ was,
and remains to a certain extent, a very popular word. Yet, today the expectations
might be lower as the realities of the courts’ limitations have been exposed.
Criticism of the Tribunal and the national courts has been longstanding, relying on
several arguments. Some of them are based on the concept of state sovereignty and
accusations of ethnic bias (this is especially the case for Bosnian Serbs – the number
of Bosnian Serb accused is larger than the number of defendants from other ethnic
groups and the Bosnian Serbs are the only ones charged with genocide). Other
criticism focuses on some of the weaknesses other international institutions
prosecuting war crimes suffer, such as inconsistencies in sentencing, ‘overuse’ of
survivor-witnesses that need to testify multiple times in different trials (and the
problem of ‘witness fatigue’); issues of length of detention for some accused;
criticism of some legal concepts like the ever controversial joint criminal enterprise
(JCE), issues of equality of arms and disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence
etc...
Nevertheless, the importance of the Tribunal both for the region and globally cannot
be ignored. The influence the ICTY had on developing jurisprudence and procedure
and raising awareness on justice issues as well as the impact it had on the formation
of other courts, mainly the International Criminal Court, should be recognized.
National Trials: The War Crimes Chamber and the local courts
The ICTY greatly influenced the beginning of war crimes prosecution in national
institutions. The Tribunal was established because, among other reasons, the national
institutions in the 1990es didn’t function properly and were not coping with the
violence that erupted. The ICTY was instrumental, several years later in assisting
them in building capacity to conduct fair war crimes trials. In other words, if the
ICTY had not been set up national prosecutions would most likely not exist. This is
one aspect in which the Tribunal was very successful – assisting the development and
strengthening of national institutions that will now be discussed.
The State Court of BiH (i.e. War Crimes Chamber, WCC) sits in Sarajevo and it has
jurisdiction over the same crimes as the ICTY. It is a national institution, somewhat
internationalized in terms of staff and procedure. It began its work in 2005 and so far
it has concluded proceedings in over 60 cases against around 100 individuals24.
Several of the now ongoing cases are dealing with the genocide in Srebrenica.
23
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It is important to stress that so far, the Prosecutor’s office in Sarajevo indicted
individuals belonging to all ethnic groups and has been governed by gravity of the
crimes and quality of evidence as well as availability of suspects in pursuing cases.
There has been no evidence of blunt political manipulations even though pressure
towards the prosecutors exists. In this respect, the involvement of foreign prosecutors
and judges, legal officers and investigators has proven to be a good way of fending
off political pressure25.
One of the positive aspects of having the State Court is the geographic proximity to
the affected communities. This also means easier access to witnesses that are still in
the country. The trial sessions are conducted in the local languages and the
courtrooms are open to visitors.
Numerous researchers from various countries came to observe the Court of BiH and it
has been judged, largely, as a success even though challenges are being faced daily.
Olga Martin – Ortega lists some of the successes identified in her research:
‘The experience of the WCC so far could be considered positive. A large number of
cases have been prosecuted; the institution works very effectively, cooperation
between national and international staff has been fluid and it is doing important work
in prosecuting according to international standards. And maybe equally significant, it
has managed to survive political attacks for the past five years. In this regard, the
WCC could provide an interesting model for the future.’26
The successes of the local courts are still humble but the situation seems to be slowly
improving (e.g. establishing a Witness Protection Unit at the Banja Luka Court). The
Cantonal Court in Sarajevo and the District Court in Banja Luka (both the biggest
courts in their respective entity) are prosecuting war crimes regularly. Other courts
have their cases too, Mostar and Tuzla being very active as well.
Some of the challenges include the lack of resources (war crimes investigations can
be complex and costly even when the suspects are lower level perpetrators; some
prosecutors’ offices don’t have prosecutors working exclusively on war crimes),
trained staff (war crimes prosecution, as well as defense in those cases, requires
specific expertise) and inadequate witness protection on the local level. In fact,
witness protection is cited as one of the biggest problems of local courts administering
justice in war crimes trials27. There are still reports of threats and intimidation against
witnesses28.
25
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Some of these challenges were addressed in the National War Crimes Strategy29 that
was adopted, after much effort and political strife in late 2008. According to this
document, local courts should be investigating only the less sensitive cases which are
not as complicated and where the perpetrators are not high-ranking officials. A great
number of cases should be prosecuted at the local level and questions remain over
their capabilities to complete this difficult task. National staff has been trained30, but
that is not enough.
The situation was confusing and difficult before the adoption of the Strategy due to
the fact that there was no centralized database of all open case files i.e. nobody really
knew what the case-load was; many indictments that were still ‘active’ in local
prosecutors’ offices were filed during the war, many of which would not be accepted
in a court today because they were biased and unfounded. More than anything else,
what was needed (and much sooner than when it actually happened) is some order – a
good idea about what the cases are, how many suspects, how many potential trials,
what is the quality of evidence etc. There was also competing jurisdictions and
overlap of efforts (e.g. when two or more prosecutors’ offices work on the same case).
That is, without a doubt, one of the lessons that can be taken from the Bosnian
experience. In order to plan prosecutions, one must know what they might include:
how many suspects, how many crimes, what is the quality of evidence (this cannot be
known with any certainty before the investigation is completed but prosecutors and
investigators can have an idea about what might there be in terms of evidence once
the work has begun).
Impact of prosecutions on the local populations
There is little confidence these days among the BiH citizens in the statement that the
ICTY and local trials contributed significantly to reconciliation31. According to one
such poll, there is also a lack of basic knowledge about the proceedings: 93% of those
participating in the poll say they don’t know one single case being tried at the local
courts32. Another recent poll reflected results that were equally discouraging33.
In certain areas of the country there is also a high level of denial or, at least, lack of
accurate information and understanding34:
‘Only 20% of those interviewed in the RS believe that genocide was committed in
Srebrenica or that civilians were targeted during the siege of Sarajevo’35.
29
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Oddly, people seem much more concerned about cases where the defendants belong
to their ethnic group than when the case is against a perpetrator of another ethnicity
but where the victims form part of one’s own group.
There is also data on the trust in the ICTY, dating back to 2002 when the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) conducted research that
resulted in the following numbers:
‘For The Hague Tribunal (ICTY), according to the survey trust ratings are highest in
Kosovo (83%) and the Bosnian Federation (51%), lowest in Serbia (8%) and RS
(4%).’ 36
All this might indicate that the positive impact the ICTY has had in international
criminal law or on the establishment of the ICC might be more relevant than the one it
had on the populations in the region. The justice it delivered seems not to be enough
to result in significant local support, but it might also be a little bit too early to judge.
Once the Tribunal completes its mandate, the assessments should continue.
Certain challenges for war crimes prosecutions
War crimes prosecution on all levels faces several challenges and has various
drawbacks. Although there are no statutory limitations for war crimes cases, there is
however biology at work and many of the suspects and witnesses are dying or
becoming too old and weak to participate in a trial. As mentioned, there is also
‘witness fatigue’: the same witnesses, often survivors of the most horrible crimes,
keep being asked to testify again and again in different proceedings.
Another problem burdening the national institutions is the confusion in relation to the
applicable law. Five criminal codes are currently being applied within BiH37: the ‘old’
Yugoslav Criminal Code, the Criminal Code of BiH (applied almost exclusively at the
State Court), the Criminal Code of the Federation of BiH and the Criminal Code of
Republika Srpska, as well as the Criminal Code of Brcko. These are different in
certain formulations and definitions of crimes and they also foresee different prison
terms for the same act. This creates legal insecurity and inconsistency that threatens
the publics’ faith in the system.
Something that has always been a point of contention, at all levels, was prosecutorial
strategy. From thousands of potential suspects, and that is what the case-files in BiH
suggest after careful analysis, how does a prosecutor decide which case to take on and
which to leave aside. How does one prioritize cases, form a case or decide on the
charges? Should the focus be on political and military leadership or lower level
perpetrators (rapists, sadistic murderers and brutal paramilitaries setting people
alight)? Does one take into consideration ethnicity or not i.e. do we try to ‘balance’
suspects by indicting members of all warring parties no matter the brutality and scale
36
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of the crime or are we only guided by gravity of the crime as the criteria for
prioritizing cases? All of these are important questions that need to be addressed when
strategizing any prosecution of mass human rights violations.
There is no clear answer to these questions and much needs to be decided on a caseby-case basis. Nevertheless, case selection at all levels caused heated political debates
and accusations of bias were frequent. Chief prosecutors have not always had a clear
idea of how to approach the difficult task they were facing. That would be another
important lesson of the prosecution experience in Bosnia: prosecution strategies
should be as clear as possible from the beginning, followed by an open discussion
with the public about the choices made.
It is difficult to measure the successes of war crimes prosecution and assess accurately
if it has produced the social and public purposes we aspired to. However, the fact that
war crimes prosecution survived years of political tension, problems with funding, an
exceptionally large caseload; fragmentation within the judicial system within BiH and
application of different criminal codes does mean that it has grown into a stable
system. Many obstacles stood in the way but the prosecution continued, the
jurisprudence grew and defendants were found guilty, sentenced and sent to prison
after impartial proceedings were conducted. Others, on the other hand, were acquitted
because their guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Some of the problems the prosecution faces are a consequence of the fact that the
judicial system as we know it has been designed for crime as an exception and not as
a rule. No judicial system can successfully deal with tens of thousands of potential
suspects and thousands of case files in such a short period of time. The only way that
could be achieved is by significantly changing the procedural rules and redefining
how trials are conducted. No country, no matter the resources, could accomplish
conducting hundreds of war crimes trials effectively, at the same time, to the highest
standards, for many years, whilst at the same time dealing with other judicial tasks in
non-war crimes cases. There are no investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
courtrooms or resources available.
War crimes prosecution after a brutal long-lasting conflict is about case selection, the
quality of evidence and setting priorities. It is about focusing on certain cases and
leaving others aside. Unfortunately, there will always be cases where one cannot
prosecute, suspects that will not be put on trial and victims that will not receive any
redress. The evidence might be lacking, the suspect is unknown or unavailable;
witnesses have died or are unable to testify… The selection needs to be made on
reasonable criteria (case selection is a separate matter, very complex and controversial
that cannot be fully addressed here) and then the public needs to be informed on why
certain cases and being pursued and others not. Clearly, in the context of BiH, this is
very problematic as all decisions to pursue certain cases and not others are often
perceived as made on political and not professional grounds. The prosecution effort
needs to be divorced from political pressure - in reality but also in public perception.
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In that sense, the institutions in BiH, on all levels, are still struggling. What is
important in this context is to have clear, realistic expectations as to what war crimes
prosecution can do (and communicate it to the public in a clear and transparent
manner).
Reparations have not been addressed and this remains a painful matter for many
victims. Recent calls to establish a Victim’s Fund38 are yet to result in concrete action,
but disappointment by the victims is clear – they haven’t received adequate
reparations for their suffering39. Retribution alone is obviously not enough; these
people need support to rebuild their lives.
Certain accomplishments and lessons for the future
The accomplishments of the war crimes prosecution efforts include finding missing
persons40, establishing a historic record of what happened, thousands of hours of
testimony have been heard…Victims have been given a chance to speak about their
experience.
Establishing facts and a historic record (e.g. documents in the ICTY archives) is
crucial for the long-term stability of a society where denial will be fought and respect
will be given to all victims. Denial breeds resentment and mistrust that can fuel
conflict. Impartial and unbiased research needs to be conducted on the causes and
consequences of the crimes so that facts can be known and recognized. This is tough
in any society and there is still denial in BiH but there has been progress since the end
of the war.
Geoffrey Nice, former prosecutor in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic at the ICTY had
this to say about the historic record at the war crimes courts, especially the Tribunal:
‘You could say the verdicts in these cases are a great deal less important than the
record of evidence that they leave behind. A record that would never be available but
for these trials that show how things happened’41 …
Nice continues:
‘Because if we can learn from how things happen – then maybe we’ll be clever
enough and sensible enough to reduce their occurrence in the future’.
Where lessons can be learned is also the prosecutorial strategy: have a clear set of
criteria that determine what cases are being taken on by which office and why (and
then explain it to the public, in order to maintain a sense of transparency). In the
prosecutors’ offices teams must be made out of professionals with specific expertise
38
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and efforts must not be duplicated. Investigations, if quality evidence does not exist
need to be closed (and properly explained to the victims’ families and the public).
Indicting several individuals for the same crime at the same time (within the same
case) might make it easier for witnesses because they would need to testify only once.
Charging needs to be realistic. There is delicate balance to strike here: the prosecutors
want to address all crimes a suspect has allegedly committed (and that can be proven
with evidence in the courtroom) while at the same time having in mind judicial
economy and trying to limit how much time and effort each trial requires in order to
be able to work on other cases.
Plea-bargaining is a very controversial and complex matter in relation to war crimes
in BiH because this practice is somewhat alien to the national judicial system.
Common law countries have, in this sense, different practices than civil ones such as
the one in BiH and this results in heavy criticism, even when the benefits of the plea
are clear42. Sometimes, prosecuting a commander depends on an insider. At times,
available evidence is not enough and the insiders can provide valuable information
about, for example, mass grave locations (if there are no survivors and no perpetrator
comes forward, many remains will never be found). Plea-bargaining remains a
contested subject but it has been used in relation to the crimes in Bosnia. A lesson
would be to communicate with the victim’s associations and explain what the benefits
of this approach are.
The future of the war crimes prosecution efforts is complex and still rather uncertain.
The ICTY is set to ‘transform’ into the Residual Mechanism in 201343; the rest of the
prosecutions need to be done by national institutions.
As mentioned, there are approximately ten thousand people that are potential suspects
in BiH. The biggest number of them will never face trial or any punishment for their
crimes and that is, sadly, a fact. The system is just not able to absorb so many war
crimes trials. For many of these crimes, evidence might also be difficult to acquire.
However, some individuals have been held accountable and others will be as well,
there just won’t be 10 000 of them. It might not even be one thousand in the end. As
stated earlier, no system, especially not one as politicized, fragmented and
impoverished would succeed with such a daunting task. Actually, with everything that
is heading against it, the war crimes prosecution effort on all three levels has been
quite successful. One aspect where it could have done more is outreach – successfully
communicating its successes to the local population.
Conclusion
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BiH was ravaged by a brutal war for four years. At the end of 1995 the shooting
stopped but the country remained destroyed and divided, its population traumatized,
impoverished and unprepared to completely ‘transition’ into peace. One of the
reasons why the transition was so difficult was the fact that thousands were murdered,
tortured, raped, humiliated and killed. Thousands were missing (and still are
today)…Unspeakable crimes were committed by all sides, albeit unequally in number
of civilian deaths they resulted in and the level of planning involved. This level of
perpetration of crimes and the brutality they involved required a firm approach, one
that would lead to the respect for the rule of law and human rights. War crimes
prosecution ended up being the prescribed solution but many still criticize its effects.
David Schwendiman, the American lawyer that headed the Special War Crimes
Department of the Prosecutor’s office in Sarajevo concludes:
‘If war crimes are not addressed in a meaningful way, political instability in Bosnia
and Herzegovina will continue and tension will persist between the sides that still
battle one another socially and politically. Until a sufficient level of accountability has
been reached to satisfy its legal obligations, Bosnia and Herzegovina must continue to
investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for atrocity during the conflict,
provide the victims and survivors with meaningful redress, and establish enough of a
reliable record, arrived at through a process that is legitimate and credible, to prevent
the history of the conflict from being manipulated and exploited for political
advantage by any side. If it fails to do this, atrocities committed during the war will
continue to frustrate the nation’s ability to provide its citizens better lives and more
opportunity’44.
What is needed is, primarily, political will. There is no political will now to properly
prosecute war crimes cases in BiH. All the accomplishments I listed have, I would
dare say, been achieved not because of the political leadership but in spite of it.
Various human rights activists, both within the country and abroad; members of
victims’ associations, journalists, academics, prosecutors and defense attorneys, some
diplomats and judges…They have all somehow contributed to the existence of war
crimes trials and the justice they provided for the victims.
The effort to continue with the trials needs to be sustained. The government needs to
commit and allocate resources to these institutions and enforce the rule of law. The
victims are overwhelmingly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, they died in the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the state owes them some justice.
Fair and impartial prosecution is necessary to remove those guilty of the most
horrendous crimes from public space. If in prison they can no longer actively
participate in political life or command armies, police forces or paramilitaries; they
cannot spread hatred and promote human rights abuses. Although there is little

44 D. Schwendiman: 'Prosecuting atrocity crimes in national courts: Looking back on 2009 in Bosnia and Herzegovina',
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empirical evidence to confirm it, some also argue that there is a strong element of
deterrence in war crimes prosecution45.
Other policy measures that should be applied are reparations for the victims,
establishing fact-finding mechanisms (such as the recently formed regional RECOM
initiative that should have some of the tasks usually attributed to truth commissions),
building memorials and paying tribute to the victims, fighting denial, support for
victims (physical, psychological and social) but also broader measures like supporting
employment, property-return etc. Prosecuting crime and corruption stemming from
the war is also a challenge. All these measures can assist a society in post-conflict
periods to minimize the potential for future conflict and even genocide.
Years are passing; it is becoming more and more difficult to prosecute war crimes.
Suspects and witnesses are dying; parents are perishing without knowing what
happened to their sons and where their bones lie. That is why the efforts should now
be intensified.
We can criticize prosecution for various reasons but in the context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, any solution that would not include a judicial process and a verdict
would not be satisfactory46. Relations between the ethnic groups are tense even today.
What would they be like if all those that have been prosecuted and convicted were
free: rapists and murderers, sadistic camp guards and hateful politicians, negligent
commanders and generals that have willfully ignored the law and killed innocent
civilians? The future in Bosnia and Herzegovina might look bleak today, but if it
weren’t for the prosecutions, it would have been bleaker.
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